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Does leadership promote cooperation 
in climate change mitigation policy? 
Abstract
In the run-up to the Copenhagen negotiations, commentators, politicians and the 
public had great expectations of some state taking the lead towards a new global 
climate deal. Is there something in such a call for leadership? In two steps, this paper 
provides an empirically informed answer to that question: The first part develops a 
theoretical account of the relation between leadership and cooperation in 
international climate change mitigation policy (ICCMP). Starting from a five-
dimensional leadership account and a simple game-theoretical analysis of the 
impediments to cooperation, it is predicted that (1) increased leadership facilitates 
cooperation in ICCMP and that (2) different leadership modes contribute to 
cooperation in varying degrees. The second part tests these hypotheses: A new 
leadership index measures the extent to which the EU exhibited leadership at the 
negotiations of the Conference of the Parties (COP) between 1995 and 2008. We find 
that it positively correlates with the level of cooperation arrived at. The result also 
holds for four out of five leadership dimensions. We conclude with a discussion of 
the scope of the result and its policy implications.
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Introduction
Climate change mitigation has been subject of international negotiations since the 
late 1980s. However, progress is modest, given that the atmospheric concentration of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) continues to rise. So international cooperation to mitigate 
global warming seems to fail. Many people have pinned their hopes on some state 
which leads the climate change negotiations by setting a good example and bringing 
other states on board. For instance, the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
traced global warming back to a “frightening lack of leadership” (Gettleman 2006). 
The expectation is that a leader enables and contributes to successful cooperation in 
international climate change mitigation policy (ICCMP). This paper examines 
whether this expectation stands up to an empirical test: Does leadership promote 
cooperation?
Recent research deals with this question in three different threads: At the level of 
grand theories of international relations, the theory of hegemonic stability 
(Kindleberger 1973, Gilpin 1975) and the theory of institutional bargaining (Young 
1989, 1991) argue that a leader is a prerequisite of international cooperation. For the 
first, leaders are hegemons which either unilaterally provide international institutions 
or use their predominant power to enforce cooperation; but leadership is more than 
that. This is reflected in the Young's approach, which develops a more 
comprehensive view on leadership (similarly Underdal 1991, 1994 and Malnes 
1995): Young takes leaders to be individuals (rather than collective agents), who try 
to overcome problems in institutional bargaining by several means.1 However, he 
fails to analyse how a leader facilitates cooperation (a similar objection applies to 
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Malnes 1995). Moreover, due to a small sample size and a lack of variation in the 
dependent variable, the theory's empirical support (Young & Osherenko 1993) is 
quite weak (cp. Hasenclever et al. 1997, 78f.). Second, at the level of mid-range 
theories about the supply of public goods, many authors regard leadership as a 
condition of cooperation (understood as the supply of public goods). However, they 
either narrowly conceive leadership as unilaterally solving a collective problem and 
neglect that leaders also push for agreement (Jones 1978, Guttman 1982, Hoel 1991, 
Murdoch & Sandler 1997, Arce M. 2001). Or they do not empirically test their 
theories (for exceptions, cp. Murdoch & Sandler 1997, Ward et al. 2001). Third, at 
the level of specific policy analysis, leadership is examined in different contexts (for 
international climate policy, cp. Gupta & Grubb 2000, Gupta & Ringius 2001, 
Andresen & Agrawala 2002, Christiansen & Wettestad 2003; for international trade 
policy, cp. Vahl 1997). However, these analyses focus on conceptualising and 
identifying leadership, but do not consider it as an explanatory variable for 
cooperation.
Hence, current research has not adequately answered the question of whether 
(and how) leadership affects cooperation: Either it provides an elaborated leadership 
account but fails to address its empirical implications for international cooperation; 
or it examines the relation between leadership and cooperation based on a 
rudimentary leadership account. The aim of this paper is to combine both approaches 
– i.e. to derive hypotheses about how leadership affects cooperation from an 
elaborate leadership account (sections 1–3) and to empirically test them by a 
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standardized quantitative framework which goes beyond the case-study based 
empirical research so far (sections 4–6). 
1. A five-dimensional leadership account
Leadership is a form of behaviour which is – as any other behaviour – characterized 
by specific intentions and specific means to realize the intentions. On the intention-
side, two things make a political agent a leader (Young 1991: 285; Underdal 1994: 
178, 181; Malnes 1995: 92): First, he intends to contribute to the solution of a 
collective action problem himself. Second, he wants others to contribute to solving it, 
too. 
But good intentions are not enough; a leader also puts his aims into action. He 
does so by using different means. These fall into five categories (henceforth called 
“leadership modes”). The first, unilateral leadership, concerns the extent to which an 
agent sets a good example in solving collective action problems. He can do so (1) by 
formulating specific goals for his own policy to solve the problem. But to be 
credible, "cheap talk" is not sufficient (cp. Underdal 1991: 143); a leader also has (2) 
to elaborate and implement instruments (e.g. technologies, funding) and (3) to 
actually achieve his self-imposed goals. 
While unilateral leadership relates to the first of a leader's intentions, the other 
four leadership modes relate to the second intention. One way in which a leader may 
encourage others to contribute to solving a collective problem is by using “hard” 
power and control over valuable resources (like raw materials or military power). 
More specifically, he can apply sanctions against defectors (e.g. embargoes) or offer 
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incentives for contributors (e.g. additional development aid). A leader thereby 
exhibits structural leadership.
The third leadership mode, problem-solving leadership, concerns the extent to 
which a leader pushes on international negotiations and tries to break deadlocks by 
using his negotiation skills. He does so, first, by influencing the common basis for 
negotiations and working towards a common understanding of the underlying 
problem. More specifically, he sets the problem on the agenda of negotiation2 or 
supports a certain interpretation of the problem (issue framing). Second, a leader 
advances negotiations by facilitating communication or balancing interests between 
different parties (mediation). Third, he links different problems with each other to 
create “negotiation packages” which meet the different claims and interests of the 
parties involved (issue linkage). For instance, linking deforestation and climate 
change mitigation by treating conservation of forests and GHG reductions 
equivalently may encourage densely wooded states to participate in climate 
negotiations.
Moreover, a leader employs his cognitive resources – knowledge, 
weltanschauung, ideas or moral convictions – to convince others to do their share in 
solving a collective problem. He thereby exhibits the fourth mode, intellectual  
leadership. In the context of ICCMP, this mainly involves referring to the scientific 
expertise about the causes and consequences of climate change.
Finally, in order to bring others on board, a leader can provide and support 
institutions which facilitate cooperation. This includes financing an institution's 
budget and bearing other states' expenses which arise from monitoring of or 
5
compliance with an international agreement. These means make up a fifth leadership 
mode, institutional leadership. Table 1 summarizes the five leadership modes and the 
associated means. 
Table 1: The five leadership modes, their bases, the associated means and the 
corresponding variable names used in the operationalisation
Note that, on this account, it is not part of the leadership concept that a leader has 
to actually generate followers (as emphasized by Underdal 1994: 195). What is 
constitutive of a leader, however, is that he has the intention to get others on board, 
i.e. that he tries to generate followers. Whether or not he is successful (and thereby 
solves the problem) is a separate question and is partly covered by the concept of 
cooperation (cp. section 2). 
The proposed account will guide the construction of a new leadership index in 
section 4. As this will allow for a comparison with other accounts, it is helpful to 
relate the proposal to the three prevailing typologies of leadership means by Young 
(1991), Underdal (1994) and Malnes (1995) (cp. Table 2): What we call “unilateral 
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leadership” was first emphasized by Underdal, but neglected by Young. Malnes 
mixed it up with what we name “intellectual leadership” and labelled both 
“directional leadership”. The use of power and resources (structural leadership) 
figures prominently in Young's account (1991: 287ff.); Underdal (1994: 186f.) and 
Malnes (1995: 96f. 12) named it “coercive leadership” or “threats and offers”, 
respectively. The best elaboration of problem-solving leadership is Malnes' (1991: 
91f.), though the other two considered it under different headings (“entrepreneurial 
leadership”, Young 1991: 287, and “instrumental leadership”, Underdal 1994: 188). 
The term “intellectual leadership” is borrowed from Young (1991: 287); Malnes 
partly included it in his “directional” leadership (Malnes 1995: 104), while Underdal 
ignored it. Finally, none of the three dealt with institutional leadership. But the 
theory of hegemonic stability emphasizes that benign hegemons contribute to the 
solution of a collective problem by supplying institutions. This feature can be 
regarded as an aspect of leadership more broadly conceived – which is the reason 
why it seems sensible to include it in a comprehensive leadership account. In 
summary, the proposed account is a synthesis of existing conceptions (for 
preparatory work at such a synthesis, cp. Grubb & Gupta 2000, Kanie 2005). It 
provides a common framework which will allow to compare and asses their relative 
strengths and weaknesses.
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Table 2: Leadership modes in the proposed account and their counterparts in 
Young's, Underdal's and Malnes's accounts
Before deriving hypotheses about how a leader may facilitate cooperation in 
ICCMP, we have to deal with a conceptual challenge: Skodvin & Andresen (2006) 
argue that the leadership concept itself is not sufficiently elaborated to be of use for 
empirical analyses, because leadership cannot be distinguished from other bargaining 
behaviour. They offer two arguments: First, at the level of the leader's motives, the 
prevailing accounts have to assume that a leader is motivated by collective goals in 
order to set leaders apart from "ordinary" bargaining parties which are motivated by 
self-interest. And this, Skodvin & Andresen argue, is inconsistent with the use of 
structural (or coercive) leadership, which is based on self-interest. Second, at the 
level of the leader's capacities, the prevailing accounts characterise leadership by 
abilities (e.g. control over events important to others, skill, energy, status) which are 
not specific to leaders, but rather shared by all bargaining parties.
While it is true that Young, Underdal and Malnes are ambiguous on a leader's 
ultimate motivation, this does not defeat the proposed synthesis. It characterises a 
leader by his intentions or goals rather than his motives for pursuing these goals: 
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Whether a leader ultimately wants to solve a collective problem out of an altruistic 
concern or out of self-interest is irrelevant as long as he tries to solve it – i.e. as long 
as he wants to make a contribution himself and wants to push others to do so, too. So 
Skodvin & Andresen's first worry does not apply in the present context. The second 
worry, however, imposes constraints on our empirical analysis: Instead of measuring 
a leader's capacities, a more promising operationalisation of leadership should focus 
on the extent to which these capacities are exercised. This is precisely what sets a 
leader apart from ordinary bargaining parties: he exercises certain capacities (which 
others might also possess) to solve a collective problem. So when operationalising 
leadership in ICCMP, we will for instance measure an agent's actual GHG reductions 
and financial contributions (rather than her reduction potential or her capacity for 
financial contributions) relative to the performance of other important agents. 
2. Impediments to cooperation in ICCMP
The mitigation of climate change is the central issue in international climate policy. 
But no single state is in a position to stop climate change by his own; rather, 
mitigation calls for collective action: Many – if not all – states have to contribute in 
order to limit global warming. Moreover, their contributions must be coordinated. 
The coordination of several states' policies in order to solve a collective problem is 
called (international) cooperation (Keohane 1984: 51). Cooperation is thus a 
necessary condition of successful climate change mitigation. However, international 
cooperation does not arise on its own: Atmospheric GHG concentration continues to 
rise and is projected to strongly increase over the next decades (IPCC 2007). So until 
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today, cooperation in ICCMP has run into obstacles. In order to understand whether 
and how a leader promotes cooperation, one has to understand these obstacles he has 
to overcome. What, then, impedes successful cooperation in ICCMP?
A game-theoretic approach to this question seems promising, as it is the very 
object of game theory to explain success and failure of cooperation in social 
interactions. The framework is deliberately kept simple, as it merely aims to identify 
the structure of the problem (i.e. the impediments to cooperation). It is not intended 
to model the course of ICCMP-negotiations or to predict its outcomes. For the latter, 
a 190-player game would be appropriate. For our purpose, a 2-player game will do. 
This is a common approach in research on ICCMP, which understands the problem 
of climate change mitigation, i.e. of reducing GHG emissions, as a prisoner's 
dilemma game (cp. Sandler 1997: 101; Finus 2001: 3f., 22f.):3
 
Suppose that two 
states, A and B, can either reduce their GHG emissions (strategy R) or not (strategy 
-R). A and B are assumed to choose the strategy that maximises their benefits. Each 
state's benefit depends on its own and the other state's strategy: First, if both A and B 
reduce their emissions, climate change is mitigated; both bear some costs, but there is 
a considerable positive pay-off for both, because the costs of climate change exceed 
the costs of its mitigation (Stern 2006). Second, if both A and B do not reduce their 
emissions, global warming becomes inexorable and both states are worse off than in 
the first case. Third, if one state reduces its emissions while the other does not, 
climate change decelerates; so both states enjoy some positive benefits (which are 
less than in the first case), but only one state bears the expenses of reduction while 
the other one free-rides. 
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Let [x,y] denote the strategy pair in which state A chooses x and B chooses y. 
Then A will prefer [-R,R] to [R,R] to [-R,-R] to [R,-R]. Similarly, B will prefer [R,-R] 
to [R,R] to [-R,-R] to [-R,R]. Representing the rank of a strategy pair [x,y] in each 
state's preference ordering by the integers 1 to 4 (where 4 stands for the most 
prefered outcome), each strategy pair [x,y] can be mapped onto a pair (i,j) where i 
represents the rank of the strategy pair [x,y] in A's preference ordering and j is the 
rank of [x,y] in B's ordering. Table 3 (the so-called “pay-off matrix”) summarizes the 
structure of the problem of climate change mitigation.
Table 3: The pay-off matrix for the problem of climate change mitigation
For each state, the instrumentally rational option to choose is not to reduce its 
emissions: If B reduces, A will maximise its benefits by not reducing. And if B does 
not reduce, A will be better off by not reducing either. So regardless of B's choice, A 
will benefit most from not reducing its emissions. As the same reasoning applies to 
B, neither state will reduce its emissions. Hence the dilemma: Although both state 
choose the individually rational option, the outcome of the interaction, [-R,-R], is – 
according to both states' preference rankings – inferior to the alternative of climate 
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change mitigation, [R, R].4 This is why in ICCMP, cooperation fails: Each state has 
overriding incentives to deviate from the cooperative outcome. Hence, the pay-off 
structure of the participating states in international climate change negotiations is the 
first impediment to cooperation in ICCMP.
One might object that both states can escape the dilemma if they communicate 
with each other. They then should realize that they can reach a Pareto-better outcome 
if both reduce their emissions and the problem would resolve. But this is untrue: As 
there is no international authority to enforce international environmental agreements, 
any such agreement is not binding. So each state has to take into account the 
possibility that the other state breaks the agreement. But if B breaks the agreement, it 
will be rational for A to do so, too. And if B does comply with the agreement, A still 
has an incentive to break it, because in absence of enforcing authorities, breaking the 
agreement will have no negative consequences. So even if states agreed to reduce 
their GHG emissions, it would still be a dominant strategy for each state to break the 
agreement and not to reduce its emissions. Thus, the lack of binding agreements (and 
correspondingly, the lack of enforcing institutions) is the second impediment to 
cooperation in ICCMP.
3. How leadership affects cooperation: hypotheses
The previous analysis identified two impediments to cooperation in ICCMP. 
Therefore, there are also two principal ways in which a leader can promote 
cooperation5 – a result which is also implicit in Underdal's analysis (Underdal 1991: 
140, 143): First, he can change the pay-off structure by increasing the benefits of 
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strategy R or the costs of -R, thereby modifying each state's preference ordering such 
that the cooperative strategy – reducing emissions – becomes dominant (Oye 1986: 
9). Second, he can increase enforceability and binding character of agreements to 
reduce GHG emissions; this supports mutual trust and reliance between the 
negotiating parties, which in turn helps to attain the Pareto-optimal outcome, i.e. 
climate change mitigation. To promote cooperation in either or both ways, a leader 
can employ the specific leadership means identified in section 1.
Changing the pay-off structure of the interaction
A leader may change the pay-off structure by using means out of four leadership 
modes: Unilateral leadership consists in formulating goals, elaborating instruments, 
and achieving the goals. With each of these, a leader convinces other states that 
mitigating climate change is less costly than previously thought. This may encourage 
others to reassess the costs of climate change mitigation; and, holding the advantages 
of mitigation constant, lower expected mitigation costs increase the willingness to 
contribute one's share (Acre M. 2001: 115f.; for a critique, cp. Hoel 1991: 55). 
Structural leadership includes sanctions and incentives, both of which may be 
employed by a leader to change the pay-off structure of the interaction in ICCMP: 
Sanctions (e.g. trade embargoes) on those unwilling to reduce their emissions 
increase the costs of the non-cooperative strategy -R; to the contrary, incentives or 
compensations (e.g. additional development aid, transfer of technology) for those 
willing to reduce their emissions increase the benefits of the cooperative strategy R. 
So R becomes more attractive relative to -R, which promotes the cooperative 
outcome [R,R].
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Within the problem-solving leadership mode, issue framing and issue linkage 
have similar effects: By framing the problem of climate change in a certain way – 
e.g. as a common problem or a problem which is economically feasible to surmount 
– a leader can promote a common interpretation of the underlying problem; this may 
change the perception of the costs of idleness and mitigation (cp. Oye 1986: 9, 11). 
By linking climate change mitigation to other issues like development aid or 
sustainable development, a leader can help to compensate for the costs of GHG 
reductions by facilitating economic development; this may encourage others to 
reduce their emissions (cp. Oye 1986: 11; Folmer et al. 1993: 315).
Finally, via using expertise and knowledge, intellectual leadership changes the 
pay-off structure, too: For instance, with reference to scientific research, a leader can 
affect other states' beliefs about cause-and-effect-chains, about their role within that 
chain, and about the likely consequences and costs of not reducing emissions – and 
states may change their preference ordering once they have reassessed the costs of -R 
(e.g. water shortage, crop failures etc.). Hence, they will be more likely to contribute 
to climate change mitigation (cp. Simmons & Martin 2002: 200).
Increasing the enforceability of agreements
The second strategy to promote cooperation is to increase the enforceability and 
binding character of agreements to reduce GHG emissions. Here, a leader can draw 
on three leadership modes. With all means from unilateral leadership, a leader 
displays that he himself contributes to the solution of the collective problem, 
irrespective of what others do. This helps dissolving other states' doubts about 
whether those who announce to cooperate really do so. So, unilateral leadership 
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creates trust, decreases uncertainty and increases the credibility of cooperative 
intentions (Oye 1986: 9-10; Underdal 1994: 185).
A second way to strengthen the enforceability of agreements is to apply (positive 
or negative) sanctions, i.e. to employ structural leadership. Sanctions can others 
make feel that agreements are rationally binding (even if they are not legally 
binding): As a threat of sanctions applies equally to all, each state has an additional 
incentive to cooperate; this in turn changes each state's expectation of what the other 
does – in the light of the further incentive, the other state's cooperation becomes 
more likely. So each state has to fear less that the other breaks the agreement. This is 
how structural leadership increases enforceability and trust among the participants.
Third, a leader quite directly affects the enforceability of international 
agreements by providing and supporting relevant institutions (i.e. by institutional  
leadership): The very essence of an international institution is to establish a legal 
framework which facilitates communication between the participants, reduces 
transaction costs (e.g. costs for monitoring of and compliance with an agreement) 
and increases legal reliability as well as trust (Keohane 1989: 111f.).
Hypotheses
These considerations suggest that a leader can overcome the first impediment to 
cooperation in ICCMP by drawing on nearly the complete leadership repertoire 
(eight out of ten leadership means); regarding the second impediment, half of all the 
means available promote cooperation (cp. Table 4). 
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Table 4: How the leadership means affect the impediments to cooperation in 
ICCMP
So the following hypotheses can be derived from the theoretical model: First, 
other things being equal, increased leadership with regard to each single leadership  
mode facilitates cooperation in ICCMP. This is because each leadership mode 
contains at least one means which is conducive to cooperation, i.e. which helps to 
overcome at least one impediment. And second, other things being equal, increased 
aggregate leadership makes cooperation in ICCMP more likely. This is because 
following the proposed model, increased aggregate leadership consists in increased 
leadership along at least one leadership mode, which is – according to the first 
hypothesis – supposed to promote cooperation.
Table 4 also suggests that the different leadership means contribute to 
cooperation in varying degrees: While the means belonging to the unilateral and 
structural mode affect both impediments to cooperation, the means belonging to the 
remaining modes only change one. This implies that the cooperation-conducive 
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effect of the first group of leadership modes is twice as high as that of the second 
group. Therefore, the aggregate leadership index to be constructed will reflect this by 
weighing the sub-indices for the different modes at a ratio of 2:2:1:1:1 (in the order 
given in Table 4). 
The theoretical model's main claim can be summarized as such: 
Other things being equal, the more a political agent engages as a leader  
(overall or with regard to a single mode), the more likely is cooperation in  
ICCMP to take place. 
We now empirically test this prediction. 
4. Measuring leadership: a new index
ICCMP, the object of this study, nowadays mainly manifests itself in annual 
Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and – since the accessory Kyoto Protocol has entered 
into force in 2005 – the Meetings of the Parties of the Protocol (COP/MOPs). The 
data basis for the empirical test thus covers the COPs from 1995 to 2008 and the 
COP/MOPs from 2005 to 2008. To test the hypotheses, we assign – to each COP – a 
value representing the extent of leadership exhibited and a value representing the 
extent of cooperation achieved. However, as the EU has generally been regarded as 
the only agent which has potentially been able to take the lead in ICCMP (Gupta & 
Ringius 2001; Hovi et al. 2003: 2; Ott 2004:16), this paper confines to measure the 
degree of leadership exhibited by the EU. So we test the hypotheses by assigning a 
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value for the EU's6 leadership and for the cooperation achieved to each COP 
(including the respective COP/MOP, where appropriate) between 1995 and 2008. 
A new leadership index
We do so by drawing on the theoretical model developed above; that is, the 
leadership index to be constructed (LS-TOTAL) should reflect the five leadership 
modes and the varying degrees in which they – presumably – facilitate cooperation. 
The general strategy is to separately operationalise the five modes (unilateral, 
structural, problem-solving, intellectual and institutional) by five sub-indices (LS-
UNI, LS-STRUCT, LS-PROB, LS-INTEL and LS-INST, respectively) and then to 
aggregate them at a ratio of 2:2:1:1:1 to obtain the aggregate variable LS-TOTAL.7
Unilateral leadership consists of (1) formulating specific targets to reduce GHG 
emissions (variable TAR), (2) actually achieving the self-imposed targets (variable 
TAR-A) and (3) proposing additional instruments if target achievement is difficult 
(variable PROP). Correspondingly, the variable for the aggregate sub-index, LS-
UNI, is the arithmetic mean of TAR, TAR-A, and PROP. To test for the EU's target 
formulation (TAR), we used two variables, TAR-1 and TAR-2, and defined TAR as 
their arithmetic mean: TAR-1 examined whether – at the COP in question – the EU 
committed itself to a GHG reduction target which is in the upper third of the 
reduction targets that all other states (excluding the EU member states) agreed upon. 
This question is not applicable to COPs at which no reduction targets were officially 
agreed on. So we also assessed whether – according to its national communication or 
the COP minutes –8 the EU announced a reduction target which exceeds its reduction 
target most recently agreed upon at a COP (this is variable TAR-2). In both cases – 
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as in all operationalising questions to follow – we adopt the general convention that 
the variable takes on the value 1 if the answer is to the affirmative and 0 otherwise. 
The focus on the nominal reduction targets may seem problematic, because it 
may not reflect the true depth of commitment. Harrison & Sundstrom (2007: 4f.) 
suggest to consider the reductions relative to the business-as-usual trajectory (to 
include e.g. "windfall reductions"). However, this will not substantially improve on 
our proposal because the true depth of commitment depends on the costs of these 
reductions (so conceived) relative to an agent's GDP – which in turn depend on the 
structure and average efficiency of its economy. While a more sophisticated 
operationalisation would indeed be desirable, lacking comparative assessments of the 
costs in question, we stick to the nominal reduction targets – bearing in mind that this 
is only a rough approximation to the true depth of commitment. 
The second component of unilateral leadership, the EU's target achievement 
(TAR-A), is likewise measured by two variables: First, we checked whether the EU's 
GHG emissions fell below or were equal to the linear target path for the year of the 
COP under consideration (TAR-A1).9 Even if this question is answered to the 
negative, the EU might have achieved significant reductions (TAR-A2), where 
“significant” means that the EU's reduction in the year before the COP in question 
was greater than the annual reduction of 0.4 percent required by the linear target 
path. The variable TAR-A is the arithmetic mean of TAR-A1 and TAR-A2. 
The third component of LS-UNI manifests itself in proposals of additional 
reduction instruments if reduction targets (as given by the linear target path) are not 
met. It is essential to consider only the most important instruments – i.e. 
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comprehensive, strategic proposals which prepare stakeholders for the future 
development of European climate change policy and legislation. This is usually done 
by the so-called White Papers of the European Commission which aim at promoting 
the further development (and implementation) of an official set of proposals in 
specific policy areas. Thus, the operationalising question for the variable PROP is: 
Did the European Commission publish a White Paper on climate policy issues in the 
year of the COP if its emissions were above its linear target path? 
Structural leadership is essentially about applying sanctions and offering 
incentives. Hence the aggregate sub-index for structural leadership, LS-STRUCT, 
will be defined as the arithmetic mean of two variables, SANCT and INCENT. The 
value of SANCT depends on whether (according the the COP minutes) the EU 
threatened to apply trade embargoes against states which were not willing to reduce 
its GHG emissions or not.10 Similarly, the value of INCENT is determined by 
whether the EU announced additional finance for mitigating climate change in 
developing countries or not.
Problem-solving leadership is characterized by two features: framing the 
problem of climate change in a way that supports cooperation and linking climate 
change mitigation policy to other policy issues. As “hard” evidence to assess issue 
framing (FRAM) is not available, we scanned the COP minutes for EU statements 
which promote an understanding of climate change as “a common problem”, “a 
collective task” or urging “a global agreement” (FRAM-1) and for EU statements 
which describe climate change mitigation instrument as “cost-effective”, 
“economically feasible”, “low cost measures” or “economic opportunity” (FRAM-2). 
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The variable FRAM is the arithmetic mean of FRAM-1 and FRAM-2. Concerning 
issue linkage (variable LINK), a first reasonable indicator for the EU’s engagement 
is its amount of development aid earmarked for mitigating climate change; for that, 
we compared the EU's annual contributions to the trust fund of the Global 
Environment Facility – the most important institution funding projects that protect 
the environment and especially the climate in developing countries – to the non-
European G7-states' contributions (relative to their respective financial potential as 
given by the gross domestic product).11 If the EU's contribution was in the upper half 
of the G7-states in the year of the COP in question, LINK-1 takes the value 1. To 
also include the EU’s effort for issue linkage in direct negotiations, we checked 
whether the EU mentioned the link between climate change mitigation and poverty 
reduction or sustainable development by statement analysis (LINK-2). The variable 
LINK is the arithmetic mean of LINK-1 and LINK-2; similarly, the sub-index 
measuring problem-solving leadership (LS-PROB) is the arithmetic mean of FRAM 
and LINK.12
Intellectual leadership is tantamount to reference to scientific expertise about 
causes and effects of climate change. A useful indicator for this is the EU's direct and 
indirect support of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the 
renowned scientific body investigating causes and effects of climate change. Direct 
support for the IPCC (BUDGET-IPCC) was measured by examining whether the EU 
contributions to the budget of the IPCC were in the upper half of the non-European 
G7-states in the year of the COP (BUDGET-IPCC-1).13 However, as this was always 
the case and the variable lacked variability, we used a second variable by introducing 
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a median split within the EU's contributions: BUDET-IPCC-2 has the value 1 if the 
EU contributions to the budget of the IPCC in the year of the COP were in the upper 
half of its IPCC-contributions between 1995 and 2008. The variable BUDGET-IPCC 
is the arithmetic mean of BUDGET-IPCC-1 and BUDGET-IPCC-2. To account for 
the EU's indirect support of the EU (SUPPORT), we draw on statement analysis 
again and checked the COP minutes for EU statements approving of IPCC results or 
its activities. The aggregate sub-index measuring intellectual leadership, LS-INTEL, 
is the arithmetic mean of BUDGET-IPCC and SUPPORT.
Institutional leadership (LS-INST) can both be measured directly and indirectly. 
It consists in providing institutions; as most institutions in international climate 
policy are administered by the UNFCCC, it seems sensible to (directly) measure the 
EU's institutional leadership by the financial support to the UNFCCC (variable 
BUDGET-UNFCCC). More specifically we asked whether the EU's contributions to 
the UNFCCC budget were in the upper half of the non-European G7-states in the 
year of the COP.14 Again, the problem turned out to be that this variable (BUDGET-
UNFCCC-1) showed no variability and hence to refine the measurement, we 
examined whether the EU's contributions to the UNFCCC budget in the year of the 
COP under consideration were in the upper half of all of its UNFCCC-budget-
contributions between 1995 and 2008 (variable BUDGET-UNFCCC-2). BUDGET-
UNFCCC is then calculated as the arithmetic mean of BUDGET-UNFCCC-1 and 
BUDGET-UNFCCC-2. However, the EU can also show institutional leadership more 
indirectly by asking for a new compliance mechanism of the UNFCCC or a 
tightening up of the existing mechanism. This will be true if the COP minutes state 
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that the EU “supports”, “proposes”, “stresses the need for” the compliance 
mechanism, or “regrets” its flaws or the lacking progress (variable COMPL). Finally, 
the aggregate index value for institutional leadership (LS-INST) is the arithmetic 
mean of BUDGET-UNFCCC and COMPL.
Figure 1 summarizes the construction of the leadership index, gives a list of the 
variables used in our operationalisation and explains the route of aggregation.
Figure 1: The aggregation scheme for the leadership index
Measuring cooperation
In section 2 we defined cooperation as the coordination of several states' policies 
aiming at the solution of a collective problem. As policy coordination comes in 
degrees, there are also different levels of cooperation: The more the negotiating 
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states adjust their policy concerning some issue to each other, the more they 
coordinate their policies and the higher the level of cooperation achieved. In the 
policy area under consideration, cooperation consists in mitigating climate change. 
This requires that the participating parties agree, first, on targets for the reduction of 
GHG emissions and, second, on a sanctioning mechanism which ensures that these 
reduction agreements can be enforced.15 
Hence, in ICCMP, policy adjustment – i.e. cooperation – happens (or fails to happen) 
with regard to two issues: the negotiation of agreements for the reduction of GHG 
emissions, and the negotiation of a compliance mechanism. Regarding the first issue 
– which is encoded by variable COOP-1 –, three levels of policy adjustment can be 
distinguished: For a specific COP, cooperation with regard to the first issue failed 
(COOP-1 = 0) if the international targets to reduce GHG emissions are not developed 
further. Mid-level cooperation with regard to the first issue is achieved (COOP-1 = 
1) if a process to negotiate GHG emission reduction targets is started or continued. If 
the negotiating states finally agree upon GHG emission reduction targets, COOP-1 
takes the highest (ordinal) value 2. 
Similarly, there are also three levels of cooperation with regard to the second 
issue: the mechanism to sanction violation of agreed reduction targets is not 
developed further; a process to develop a new or to strengthen an existing 
compliance mechanism is started or continued; the negotiating states finally agree 
upon a compliance mechanism. These outcomes are encoded by variable COOP-2 
with (ordinal) values 0, 1, and 2 respectively. The aggregate index COOP measuring 
24
the dependent variable cooperation is the sum of both sub-indices, COOP-1 and 
COOP-2.
5. How leadership affects cooperation: results
Table 5 reports the values of the independent variable, LS-TOTAL (with all its sub-
indices) as well as the values of the dependent variable COOP for each COP between 
1995 and 2008.16 Both variables vary over a significant part of the intended domain, 
indicating that the leadership index indeed differentiates between different COPs.
Table 5: The EU's leadership in ICCMP and the level of cooperation achieved at the 
COPs between 1995 and 2008
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Figure 2 breaks down the EU's leadership into its five modes. It emphasizes that 
EU leadership has been high (LS-TOTAL  3.5) in 1997, 2001 (at COP 6b), 2005, 
2007 and 2008. Hence, the measurements partially reflect the assessments in the 
literature (cp. Ott 1997: 176; Ott 2001: 476; Schreurs & Tiberghien 2007: 19f.; 
Oberthür & Kelly 2008: 36). Conversely, the EU has shown relatively little 
leadership (LS-TOTAL  1.75) in 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. Again, this view is 
shared by non-quantitative assessments by Ott (2000: 174) and Hovi et al. (2003: 
17f.). Interestingly, the EU's highest leadership value achieved is 4; given that the 
theoretical maximum of LS-TOTAL is 7, this means the EU has not realized her full 
leadership potential.
Concerning the dependent variable, the nations have been cooperating at a high 
level (COOP = 3) in 1997 and 2005, while cooperation was low or failed completely 
(COOP = 0) in 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2004. Thus, the two COPs with the highest 
levels of cooperation are among those at which the EU showed strong leadership; 
and three out of four COPs at which the EU showed little leadership are among those 
at which cooperation failed. This is a first set of evidence supporting our hypotheses. 
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Figure 2: The EU's leadership in five leadership modes at the COPs between 1995 
and 2008
Statistical analysis further strengthens this result: Treating COOP as ordinal 
scale data, the Spearman's rank correlation between LS-TOTAL and COOP is  = 
0.731 (p = 0.002): Hence, leadership is indeed positively associated with cooperation 
(cp. Figure 3 for an illustration).17 
Figure 3: The association between the level of aggregate leadership, LS-TOTAL, and 
the level of cooperation, COOP (n = 15)
28
The association is fitted well by a proportional odds logistic regression model, 
with LS-TOTAL being the predictor variable (pseudo-R² = 0.561,18 p = 0.001): The 
probability for high-cooperation outcomes (as predicted by the statistical model) 
increases with increasing EU leadership, while the probability for low-cooperation 
outcomes decreases (cp. Figure 4); for instance, the probability that cooperation is 
highly successful (COOP = 3) grows from about 1 per cent at low levels of 
leadership (LS-TOTAL = 1.75) to about 38 per cent at high levels of leadership (LS-
TOTAL = 4). Given the non-experimental design of the study, the coefficient of 
determination is relatively high. Hence, the EU's aggregate leadership is indeed a 
suitable predictor for estimating the level of cooperation in ICCMP: The more the 
EU engaged as a leader, the more cooperation was achieved.
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Figure 4: Predicted probabilities for the level of cooperation at different levels of 
leadership using a proportional odds logistic regression model
The hypotheses set out in the theoretical part of this paper also suggested a 
positive relationship between cooperation and each leadership mode. The statistical 
analysis is less univocal in this respect (cp. Table 6): For each leadership mode, the 
(rank) correlation between the mode and the level of cooperation is positive, which is 
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consistent with out hypothesis. While the correlation is close for unilateral 
leadership, it is weak to moderate for structural, intellectual and institutional 
leadership; there is no evidence that problem-solving leadership positively 
contributes to cooperation. In part, this may be due to the little variability in these 
variables (LS-UNI takes six different values, while the other variables take less). 
However, the correlation is statistically significant for unilateral leadership only. A 
proportional odds logistic regression model with LS-UNI as the predictor variable 
shows that unilateral leadership itself even better accounts for the variability in the 
level of cooperation than the aggregate leadership index does. 
Table 6: Statistical characteristics of the different leadership modes
In summary, the statistical analysis supports the hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical model for aggregate leadership and for the unilateral leadership mode; 
with regard to the other leadership modes, empirical evidence is consistent with our 
hypothesis, but fails to support it. 
6. Discussion
31
The analysis suggests that aggregate leadership is indeed an important factor for 
cooperation in ICCMP. However, it is important to note that the operationalisation of 
cooperation focuses on the output of ICCMP-negotiations (regime formation) rather 
than on the impact of the regime on climate change mitigation. Therefore, the 
conclusion to be drawn from the analysis is that leadership facilitates regime 
formation. Whether or not these regimes effectively deal with the underlying 
collective problem is a separate question which we have not addressed (for this, cp. 
Miles et al. 2001). 
The positive effect of leadership on cooperation (regime formation) seems to 
also hold for unilateral leadership but not for other leadership modes. Moreover, the 
cooperation-facilitating impact of (aggregate) leadership can ultimately be ascribed 
to a single mode, unilateral leadership. This suggests that unilateral leadership may 
be the most important leadership mode with regard to cooperation, while the role of 
sanctions and incentives (structural leadership), negotiation skills (problem-solving 
leadership), weltanschauung (intellectual leadership) or the ability to supply 
institutions (institutional leadership) in promoting cooperation may be overestimated. 
At the outset, we distinguished two intentions that make a leader: he wants to (a) 
contribute to solving a collective problem and (b) to encourage others to contribute to 
solving it. Unilateral leadership mainly serves the first intention, which may be 
called the “exemplary function” of a leader, while the other leadership modes relate 
to the second intention, the “emulation function”. With this terminology at hand, the 
empirical evidence suggests that in ICCMP the exemplary function is more 
conducive to cooperation (regime formation) than the emulation function. This might 
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have important policy implications: “Putting one's own house in order first” is more 
likely to get others on board than directly pushing them to do their share. 
However, one has to be cautious: First, as noted in section 4, the 
operationalisation of unilateral leadership depends on a very rough (and possibly 
overestimating) approximation of the reduction burdens the EU really has to face. 
Second, the operationalisation of problem-solving leadership does not take into 
account the course of informal negotiations. These two qualifications indicate that 
the data overrates the contribution of unilateral leadership and underrates the impact 
of problem-solving leadership. Third, one has to keep in mind that we have not 
considered the leadership behaviour of other agents than the EU. So the finding that 
unilateral leadership is more conducive to cooperation than other modes may be due 
to the EU's particular pattern of leadership behaviour rather than an intrinsic feature 
of the leadeship modes. 
To comprehensively evaluate the proposed model, one should compare it with 
competing models. The relevant alternatives are Young's, Underdal's and Malnes' 
models, each of which considers (a different number of) different leadership modes 
(cp. Table 2). By treating our sub-indices as operationalisations of the corresponding 
leadership modes of these models, it is possible to construct a leadership index for 
each alternative leadership account. More specifically, leadership according to 
Young's model, LS-YOUNG, is the sum of LS-STRUCT, LS-PROB and LS-INTEL; 
leadership according to Underdal, LS-UNDERDAL, is the sum of LS-UNI, LS-
STRUCT and LS-PROB; finally, leadership in Malnes' model, LS-MALNES, is 
calculated as the sum of LS-UNI, LS-STRUCT, LS-PROB and LS-INTEL.19 To 
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compare the performance of theses indices with our model, each index is subject to 
the same statistical analysis as before. The results are given in Table 7, along with 
the number of leadership modes each model considers and the number of levels the 
predictor variable attains: All indices positively correlate with the level of 
cooperation, although the correlation fails to be statistically significant for Young's 
model (p > 0.05). The correlation is slightly higher in the model proposed in this 
paper than in Underdal's and Malnes' model; the pseudo-R² values are, however, 
significantly higher in the proposed model. 
Table 7: Statistical comparison of competing leadership models
There are three reasons for this: First, as Table 7 illustrates, the explanatory 
power of the models (as captured by the pseudo-R² value) increases with the number 
of leadership modes considered and the number of levels the predictor variable takes. 
In other words, the more differentiated the underlying leadership concept, the better 
the model accounts for the cooperation-facilitating impact of leadership. The 
conceptual work of section 1 – a pre-condition of a differentiated operationalisation 
of the independent variable – therefore pays off in terms of empirical success.
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Second, the proposed model is the only one using different weights for different 
leadership modes. Differential weighing was justified by theoretical considerations in 
sections 2 and 3: A simple game-theoretic analysis of the interaction in ICCMP 
shows that different leadership modes facilitate cooperation by overcoming different 
impediments to cooperation. Therefore, the theoretical work in sections 2 and 3 can 
also be considered as a pre-condition of the empirical success of the proposed 
account. 
Third, one has to keep in mind that we apply Young's and Malnes' conceptions to 
collective agents and thereby extend them beyond their originally intended scope (cp. 
footnote 1). This may also account for their relatively weak empirical performance. 
Conclusion and outlook
This paper examined whether – from an empirically informed standpoint – ICCMP 
can expect progress from the common call for leadership. The answer is to the 
affirmative: Empirical evidence suggests that aggregate leadership indeed positively 
contributes to cooperation (conceived as output) in ICCMP. One leadership mode, 
unilateral leadership, seems to be especially important in this respect; thus, setting a 
good example by significantly contributing to climate change mitigation could be a 
key to cooperation in ICCMP. Moreover, the proposed five-dimensional leadership 
concept better accounts for the positive correlation between leadership and 
cooperation than the prevailing accounts of Young, Underdal and Malnes do.
However, these results are subject to some limitations and there remain at least 
three open questions about their scope:
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1. Are the results policy-specific? The present study has focused on ICCMP; as 
climate policy does not only consist of mitigation policy, a natural question is 
whether leadership also promotes cooperation in other climate issues (such as 
climate change adaptation policy) or other policy fields (biodiversity, 
disarmament ). The interaction between the involved political agents may 
then have a different game-theoretic structure; consequently, the impediments 
to cooperation can differ and so do the ways in which a leader may overcome 
these impediments. The results of such an inquiry may complement the 
present study and show whether the impact of leadership on cooperation 
depends on the policy area.
2. Are the outcomes agent-specific? The paper equated leadership at the COPs 
with leadership as shown by the EU at the COPs. This is a restriction, 
although a justified one: The EU is generally regarded as the only agent 
having potentially been capable of taking the lead in ICCMP. Nevertheless, 
this assumption should, in principle, be subject to empirical scrutiny. A more 
comprehensive approach to the impact of leadership on cooperation is to 
assign a leadership value to each agent considered relevant (cp. Breitmeier et 
al. 2006) and to aggregate these values to some index operationalising 
leadership as shown by the whole community of participating states. Such an 
approach would also cover the possibility that the EU's leadership efforts 
could be undermined by the “anti-leaders”, i.e. states which actively obstruct 
ICCMP-negotiations. As “anti-leadership” behaviour potentially interferes 
with the – alleged – cooperation-facilitating effect of leadership, the data 
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might support the hypotheses even more strongly if we had controlled for 
anti-leadership. Further progress may be achieved by combining our 
approach with the one followed by Breitmeier et al. (2006), which also takes 
"laggards" into account (cp. footnote 5). 
3. Are the results model-specific? The derivation of our hypotheses was based 
on a specific model of the interaction between the participating parties in 
ICCMP as a two-persons, one-shot prisoners' dilemma game. We sidestepped 
the questions of whether it is more appropriate to model the interaction as 
iterated, n-person games (cp. Sandler 1997: 29ff; Finus 2002). Such an 
approach would allow for a more sophisticated operationalisation, as it is 
likely to reveal further ways in which a leader may overcome impediments to 
cooperation.
These issues should be taken as pointers to further conceptual, theoretical and 
empirical research.
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Notes
1 We will continue to treat Young's and Malnes' accounts as if the apply to 
collective agents. The reason for doing so is that individuals in institutional 
bargaining act as representatives of collective agents (Underdal 1994: 180); 
therefore, these conceptions of individual leadership mirror properties of 
leadership of collective agents. 
2 The agenda of international climate negotiations is set non-publicly and is 
therefore unsuitable for operationalisation. Hence, we ignore agenda-setting in 
the theoretical and empirical part of this paper.
3 The application of game theory to social phenomena is not uncontroversial. 
Although we partially agree with the criticism, we employ an instrumentalist 
understanding of game-theoretic models: We use them to derive hypotheses 
about the object of inquiry; and if these turn out to be true and informative, the 
use of game-theory seems justified.
4 [R,R] is said to be a “Pareto-optimal” outcome: Neither state can be better off 
without the other being worse off. This does not hold for [-R,-R].
5 We suppose that a leader is not himself a player in the game he affects. Cp. 
Colomer (1995) for an analysis assuming the contrary.
6 For reasons of cross-temporal comparability, “EU” refers to the EU-15 prior to 
the Eastern enlargement in 2004.
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7 The only leadership index available so far can be derived from the International 
Regime Database (IRD) by Breitmeier et al. (2006). The IRD measures state 
leadership by two variables: It classifies each important state on a pusher-
laggard-scale and determines whether each important states' effort was primarily 
"structural", "ideational" or "entrepreneurial". As the coding only covers the 
initial phase of international climate change policy and considers aggregated 
time periods (1992-1997 and 1997-1998), the IRD-data does not exactly fit our 
purposes: the IRD-data provides too few data points to quantitatively assess the 
relation between leadership and cooperation. We therefore use a more fine-
grained time scale. Second, we want to take the IRD's assessment further: In 
addition to coding the primary leadership dimensions (of the EU), we want to 
assess the degrees to which these dimensions are realized.
8 The national communications are reports about the progress concerning the 
reduction of GHG emissions which every party of the UNFCCC is obliged to 
periodically deliver. 
9 The data source for this assessment is the GHG inventory, an annual report by 
the European Environmental Agency. The linear target path shows the EU's 
annual reduction until 2010 (as average of the emissions of 2008-2012) if it were 
to achieve its reduction target (eight percent less GHG emissions than in 1990 by 
2010) in a linear reduction scenario, i.e. with constant absolute yearly reductions 
of 0.4 percent of the 1990 emissions. 
A slight complication is that the Kyoto Protocol was agreed on in 1997, while 
the time frame considered here starts in 1995. However, a stabilisation of GHG 
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emissions on 1990 levels was already agreed upon in the UNFCCC in 1992. 
Therefore, for 1995 and 1996, TAR-A1 is “1” if and only if the EU’s GHG 
emissions were below or equal to the GHG emissions of 1990.
10 Focussing on trade sanctions is in line with the observation that in international 
policy in general, sanctions are mainly trade sanctions (Viguier 1994: 197). 
However, the unavoidable reference to trade policy introduces an irreducible 
element of issue linkage. 
11 Here (and in some other comparisons to follow), choosing the G7-states as an 
object of comparison is imperative because only the G7-states can significantly 
finance development aid; all other states would be overtaken by the EU anyway. 
As the contributions of the G7-members France, Germany, Great Britain and 
Italy are already accounted for by the EU-budget, the proper comparison is 
between the EU and the non-European G7-states. 
12 One problem with this operationalisation is that it does not account for the fact 
that problem-solving leadership mainly manifests itself in informal negotiations 
which are not covered by the formal COP-minutes. This partially explains why 
our data for LS-PROB (cp. section 5) overrates problem-solving leadership in 
1997 (cp. Grubb et al. 1999: 112) and underrates it in 2001 (cp. Hovi et al. 2003: 
18f.). 
13 We only considered absolute contribution and did not undertake a comparison 
relative to the gross domestic product; this is because the financial contributions 
to the IPCC are so little that financial support will depend on the good will of a 
state only – and not on its financial potential.
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14 The EU's contribution is defined as the sum of the voluntary contributions of the 
EU-15 and the European Commission to the “Supplementary Fund” and the 
“Participation Fund” of the UNFCCC.
15 We sidestep the question of whether the reduction targets and the sanctioning 
mechanism are effective in mitigating climate change. The operationalisation 
thus frames cooperation as output rather than impact (cp. section 6). The reason 
for doing so is that, until now, ICCMP-negotiations have not helped avoiding 
climate change. So the "impact-component" of cooperation in ICCMP is 
virtually zero.
An alternative attempt to measure cooperation (as output) frames the differences 
in cooperation levels as “policy change” and then applies a classification of 
different levels of policy change (as developed by Hall 1993). However, this 
approach does not fit the purpose of this paper, because the concept of policy 
change and the concept of cooperation can fall apart: The policy change between 
two consecutive COPs may be small (e.g. an increase in the reduction target 
from -30 per cent to -32 per cent) even though the level of cooperation achieved 
is high at both COPs. 
16 The complete data set, including data sources, is available at 
http://www.leadership-index.de.
17 Of course, the correlation design of our inquiry does not support the conclusion 
that leadership causes cooperation to be higher.
18 As an estimator of the coefficient of determination we used Nagelkerke's R² 
(Nagelkerke 1991).
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19 In each case, the summands are of equal weight because these models do not 
allow a derivation of different weights. In speaking of “leadership according to 
X's model” we refer to our most charitable understanding of the respective 
account. We do not claim that the indices which we construct on behalf of 
Young, Underdal and Malnes are the indices which they themselves would have 
come to if they empirically tested our hypothesis within their models. 
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